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THE UNMASKING OPTION 
JAMES GRIMMELMANN† 
I’d like to tell a story about online harassment and extract a surpris-
ing proposal from it. I’m going to argue that we should consider selec-
tively unmasking anonymous online speakers, not as an aid to litigation, 
but as a substitute for it. Identifying harassers can be an effective way of 
holding them accountable, while causing less of a chilling effect on so-
cially valuable speech than liability would. 
In the end, I’ll conclude that this proposal is unworkable due to the 
danger of pretextual uses of an unmasking remedy by plaintiffs looking 
to engage in extra-legal retaliation. Even this conclusion, though, has 
something valuable to teach us about the uses and abuses of online ano-
nymity. Decoupling anonymity from liability enables us to understand 
more clearly what’s at stake with each. 
I. SKANKS IN NYC 
To set the stage, let’s talk about Skanks in NYC.1 That’s the name 
of an anonymous blog someone created on Google’s Blogspot service. 
Actually, calling it a “blog” may be something of an overstatement. It 
consisted of five entries, all posted the same day, in which the anony-
mous author called a model named Liskula Cohen, a “psychotic, lying, 
whoring . . . skank,” “Skankiest in NYC,” a “ho” and so on. 
Cohen filed for a “pre-action disclosure” order against Google to 
disclose the anonymous blogger’s name so she could sue for defamation. 
The blogger objected, saying the posts were just hyperbole and “trash 
talk,” not anything actionable. The judge, however, agreed with Cohen, 
looking to the American Heritage Dictionary definition of “skank” to 
conclude that calling someone “disgustingly foul or filthy and often con-
sidered sexually promiscuous” is defamatory. Thus, since Cohen had a 
“meritorious cause of action,” the judge ordered Google to disclose the 
blogger’s identity.2 
In an O’Henry-esque plot twist, the anonymous blogger turned out 
to be one Rosemary Port—if not quite a friend of Cohen’s, then certainly 
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a frenemy. According to an (anonymous) source who spoke to the New 
York Post,3 the source of Port’s anger was that Cohen had criticized the 
company Port kept to Port’s boyfriend. After learning who her antagonist 
was, Cohen filed a $3 million defamation suit, but quickly dropped it, 
saying, “It adds nothing to my life to hurt hers. I wish her happiness.” 
A. Right and Wrong  
Port’s conduct may have been unfortunate, but what should we 
make of Cohen’s? Although they vary in the threshold they require the 
plaintiff to meet, courts across the country agree that a “John Doe sub-
poena” of this sort should issue only where the plaintiff appears to have a 
winnable lawsuit against the (as-yet unknown) defendant. Cohen repre-
sented to the court that she had an urgent legal need for Port’s identity—
to file her defamation lawsuit—and that was the basis for the court’s 
ruling.  But almost as soon Cohen had Port’s name in hand, the lawsuit 
went by the wayside. So much for urgent legal need. Was this a hypo-
critical abuse of the legal system? 
Dan Solove thought so. He’s written, “The law must restrict bad-
faith lawsuits designed solely to unmask anonymous speakers.”4 He saw 
Cohen’s suit in precisely those terms, saying it appeared “she was using 
the lawsuit only to unmask the blogger.”5 For him, the Skanks in NYC 
case is an abuse of the justice system. 
I think Solove has things exactly backwards. Cohen v. Google 
wasn’t an abuse of the justice system, it was justice. Rosemary Port got 
exactly what she deserved. She tried to shame Cohen; the result was that 
she herself was shamed. That seems about right. There’s something 
beautifully Kantian about it. Lawrence Becker would say that it was a 
“fitting” and “proportionate” “return.”6 
It strikes me as a good thing that Cohen dropped her lawsuit. For 
one thing, lawsuits are shockingly expensive. Cohen resolved her beef 
against Port for a small fraction of what litigation through final judgment 
would have cost. If the only response to online harassment is willingness 
to litigate, then only the rich will have any protection against it at all. For 
another, what more would Cohen have achieved by carrying her lawsuit 
through to the bitter end? Port was apparently close to judgment-proof, 
which is another way of saying that a verdict for Cohen would have 
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bankrupted Port without actually achieving anything for Cohen. And for 
yet another, it’s not self-evident that Cohen would have won a defama-
tion suit. I’m more confident that calling someone a “ho” and a “whoring 
skank” online is morally wrong than I am that it’s legally actionable. In 
many cases, the convoluted doctrines of defamation and privacy law will 
deny recovery for reasons that have little to do with the blameworthiness 
of the defendant’s conduct. 
Perhaps this lawsuit was pretextual. But if so, then bring on the pre-
textual lawsuits! It’s better to have pretextual lawsuits that are resolved 
quickly and lead to appropriate embarrassment than protracted lawsuits 
that cause serious additional harm to the defendant. And once we put it 
this way, why not cut out the middleman? If there’s nothing wrong with 
a pretextual lawsuit brought to unmask the defendant, we might as well 
drop the fiction of the lawsuit as the basis for unmasking. I’m proposing, 
in other words, that the legal system prefer unmasking to the standard 
remedies at law. Without dwelling on the details, what if we had a sys-
tem that routinely unmasked defendants, one that channeled plaintiffs 
into unmasking and away from damage suits? 
II. A THOUGHT EXPERIMENT  
Thus, here’s a proposal for a kind of minimally invasive surgery to 
deal with online harassment. Suppose that we were to give the victims of 
online harassment an expedited procedure to unmask their harassers. 
Specifically, following a quick judicial proceeding with an easier re-
quired showing, a relevant intermediary would be required to turn over 
whatever it knew about the harasser (typically an IP address or sub-
scriber information). In return, the plaintiff would be required to give up 
all remedies at law. These two rules, taken together, would channel many 
cases into unmasking rather than into litigation. 
My intent is not to endorse complete reciprocal transparency in all 
things, along the lines of David Brin’s The Transparent Society.7 That’s a 
recipe for madness; privacy is a basic element of the human condition. 
Most people who choose to go online without identifying themselves 
have a good reason for it, and we should ordinarily respect that decision. 
I’m also not suggesting any new data-retention requirements. At least for 
now, the Internet’s ad hoc balance—it’s easy to keep your identity super-
ficially private and hard to keep it truly private—is about right. The ha-
rassers we really think we can reach—the AutoAdmit posters, the lulz-
mobs, the Rosemary Ports—aren’t using advanced techniques to hide 
their identities. 
There are many things to like about unmasking. In the first place, 
it’s particularly effective at dealing with harassment. Many of the worst 
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cases involve online mobs: crowds of mutually anonymous people who 
spur each other on to increasingly nasty behavior. One of the best ways 
to bust up a mob is to call out its members by name, like Atticus Finch in 
front of the jailhouse. It rehumanizes them, activating feelings of empa-
thy and shame, removing the dangerous psychological condition in 
which they fear no reprisal. In this respect, visible acts of unmasking—
which make members of the crowd more aware that their actions have 
consequences—may be a more effective deterrent than actually punish-
ing them. 
Unmasking also has some major advantages over other possible re-
sponses to anonymous online harassment. The First Amendment puts 
significant limits on the use of tort law. This leads to cases in which 
harmful, wrongful speech can’t be redressed through a suit for damages. 
In response, we’ve seen equally dangerous calls to pare back the First 
Amendment’s protections. Unmasking sidesteps that dilemma. Not all 
the speech that we’d like to protect under the First Amendment needs to 
be protected as anonymous speech.  
Similarly, unmasking is a better option in many cases than holding 
intermediaries liable. The typical poster to a web site is more morally 
responsible, and better able to control her own speech, than the web site 
operator, its hosting provider, or the ISP. Making any of these intermedi-
aries liable is likely to lead to substantial chilling effects, as they take 
down any potentially problematic material at the drop of a hat. Our expe-
rience with the DMCA in this regard hasn’t been particularly cheerful. In 
contrast, requiring these intermediaries only to turn over what informa-
tion they have on the identity of the poster is a smaller burden, and one 
that doesn’t give them bad incentives to take down too much material. 
On balance, an identification requirement is likely to be more 
speech-friendly than most of the alternatives on the table. It avoids the 
excessively censorious effects of direct and intermediary liability—but it 
also helps protect the speech interests of the victims of anonymous online 
harassment, who in many cases today are forced off the web in fear. 
A. Shame, Good and Bad  
Let us be clear. An argument for regular unmasking is, in effect, an 
argument for vigilantism. One of the reasons unmasking works is that it 
exposes anonymous harassers to mass shaming. Solove has argued8 that 
online shaming can be “the scarlet letter in digital form,” a point he illus-
trates with the story of Dog Poop Girl, who was vilified by millions on 
the Internet after failing to clean up after her dog on the subway. 
From that perspective, to unmask posters is to open up Pandora’s 
Box. Rosemary Port could become the next Dog Poop Girl, her face plas-
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tered everywhere online, as millions of people mock her, exposing her to 
shame and retaliation that far exceeds anything she deserved. Aren’t we 
unleashing exactly the same forces of hate and innuendo that we’re sup-
posed to be tamping down, leading to a never-ending shame spiral? 
Compared with legal process and societal oversight, isn’t this illiberal-
ism, pure and simple? 
Perhaps. But if so, it’s a surprisingly tolerable kind of illiberalism. 
The legal system does violence, too; it uses the full power of society and 
the state against its victims in a very real and direct way. Dog Poop Girl-
level abuse will be rare, but damage lawsuits in run-of-the-mill harass-
ment cases will routinely all but wipe out defendants. If the alternative is 
being sued into bankruptcy, online shaming isn’t the worst option out 
there. 
Perhaps even more tellingly, look who started the hate. As between 
the innocent plaintiff and the defendant who originally posted mean 
things about her, it seems clear which of these two ought to bear the risk 
of a disproportionate response. There’s still a plausible fit between the 
harm the shamer caused and the consequences she must endure. And if 
massive online shame for the shamer is a potential outcome, this seems 
like a singularly appropriate form of deterrence, one that might actually 
be psychologically effective with would-be harassers. 
B. Retaliation  
And now for my own O’Henry-esque twist. I’ve just argued that an 
unmasking option is superior on most theoretical dimensions to tradi-
tional lawsuits. But I don’t see a way of making it work in practice. 
Sometimes a lawsuit, with a good old-fashioned damage remedy, 
really is the best outcome. If harassment leads you to lose your job, that’s 
a real, economic harm, and compensatory damages make sense. Forcing 
a plaintiff to give up any hope of that remedy is making matters worse.  
In theory, we could design the unmasking option so that the plaintiff 
gets to choose between unmasking (with a lowered threshold) or a law-
suit (with the usual John Doe subpoena standard). But that’s an awful 
choice to put the plaintiff to, because of Arrow’s Information Paradox. 
Until she finds out who her harasser is, she’s not in a good position to 
choose: she can’t tell whether the harasser is embarrassment-proof or 
judgment-proof. What if she chooses the identification, only to learn that 
her nemesis is a rich recluse who enjoys victimizing women and doesn’t 
care about his own reputation? 
If the unmasking option is unfair to plaintiffs, it’s also unfair to de-
fendants. You can bet that a corporate CEO would love to characterize 
some salty criticism of his leadership as “harassment,” trace it back to an 
employee, and take a little revenge. Here, even if we require the plaintiff 
to give up legal remedies, identification itself imposes serious harms. A 
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company that can retaliate in ways other than filing a lawsuit would be 
delighted with the unmasking option’s lowered threshold. 
Thus, it turns out that the trade at the core of the unmasking op-
tion—get an identity in exchange for giving up the right to sue—is 
poorly matched. Sometimes plaintiffs get far too little; sometimes they 
get far too much. 
C. Pretext  
This conclusion, however, tells us something important about online 
privacy.  Many anonymous posters justifiably fear the pretextual plain-
tiff. As soon as we lower the standard to unmask people online, we open 
the door to all sorts of disquieting uses. Companies want to unmask 
whistleblowers, and perhaps some stalkers might find a way to use it to 
learn more about their victims. 
This is a classic problem of privacy as a second-best solution. I said 
earlier that people have legitimate reasons to go online anonymously. 
Our belief that those reasons are legitimate stems from the idea that it 
would be wrong for these people to have to suffer being fired, being 
stalked, being personally embarrassed, and so on. But in many cases, 
these wrongs are harms the law has principled reasons not to redress di-
rectly, or simply has practical difficulties in dealing with. Free speech 
rights, freedom of contract, and the difficulties of proving causation will 
mean that many people who suffer retaliation will have no legal redress 
for it. Anonymity is the best we can practically do, and so, unless we’re 
prepared to make much bigger changes to the legal landscape, we’ll have 
to protect people from pretextual unmasking. 
But if the fear of pretext is legitimate, the strength of the plaintiff’s 
cause of action isn’t always a very good proxy for it. Some plaintiffs will 
have a valid lawsuit, but bring it for totally pretextual reasons—a few 
stray comments about a mid-level corporate executive could blow a 
whistleblower’s anonymity. Contrariwise as I’ve been arguing, there are 
plenty of people who ought to be unmasked, but who haven’t done any-
thing actionably tortious, given the labyrinthine folds of defamation and 
privacy law.  Pretextual lawsuits need not be baseless, and vice versa. 
CONCLUSIONS  
Thus, I take two lessons from this thought experiment. The first is 
that we need to decouple unmasking and litigation. The precise inversion 
I proposed—give up your lawsuit to make unmasking easier—doesn’t 
work. But we should be more creatively exploring unmasking standards 
that aren’t directly tied to the strength of the plaintiff’s case in chief.  We 
should consider the pros and cons of unmasking directly, on their own 
merits, without always referring back to the lawsuit.  
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So, on the one hand, in order to better protect the victims’ interests 
in these lawsuits, we should find ways of dropping elements from a typi-
cal John Doe subpoena. Thus, for example, a plaintiff typically needs to 
show necessity: that she’s exhausted other options to learn the harasser’s 
identity. Chuck that one out the window; if the plaintiff thinks that ask-
ing the intermediary for the identifying information is the best way to 
learn who the harasser is, that ought to be good enough for us. 
On the other hand, to protect defendants, we should be more explicit 
about pretextual unmasking. Right now, we’re protecting defendants by 
testing the strength of the plaintiff’s case. We should acknowledge ex-
plicitly that the true threat is retaliation, and develop doctrines that di-
rectly ask whether the defendant legitimately fears retaliation from being 
unmasked. Those doctrines could then usefully be applied in any case 
where unmasking is at stake, regardless of the area of law in which it 
arises. 
This is a Legal Realist argument. It’s concerned with the social 
goals the law is trying to achieve—and with what the law on the ground 
is actually doing, regardless of what the law says it’s doing. A John Doe 
subpoena standard that sees only the strength of the plaintiff’s case is 
ultimately both unjust and unstable, because it’s asking the wrong ques-
tion. Unmasking is the very best kind of wrong answer: it helps us under-
stand the question we meant to ask. 
 
